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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990987-CA 
Priority No. 2 
On appeal, Defendant Shayne Hansen is challenging the trial court's ruling that he 
consented to a search of his car. Hansen maintains that the consent was unlawful in two 
respects: First, it was obtained in violation of State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 
App. 1996), where the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support consent; and 
second, the consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
In response to Hansen's arguments on appeal, the state has claimed the following: 
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the state has asked this Court essentially 
to overrule Ham and/or to adopt a new standard of review for consent. That is 
unnecessary. The state's complaints with Ham are not relevant to this case. The state 
also has argued that Officer Huntington's conclusory statements concerning consent 
provide a sufficient basis for the trial court's ruling. The state's assertions are 
insupportable and should not be upheld for policy reasons. See infra point A, herein. 
With respect to the exploitation analysis, Hansen maintains that the consent came 
on the heels of an unlawful, level-two encounter in violation of Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). The state disagrees, and asserts that the consent was obtained during a level-one, 
consensual encounter. Thus, the state claims there was no prior illegality to the consent. 
The state's analysis concerning the matter disregards the total circumstances and should 
be disregarded. See infra point B, herein. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING CONSENT ARE 
UNPERSUASIVE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: (A^ THE 
OFFICER'S CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS DO NOT PROVIDE A 
SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR CONSENT. AND (B) THE TOTAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES FAIL TO SUPPORT THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT 
CONSENT WAS OBTAINED DURING A LEVEL-ONE ENCOUNTER. 
Utah law provides that a search following consent is valid only if (1) the consent 
was voluntarily given, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a 
prior illegality. State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). Hansen maintains that 
the consent obtained in this case violated both prongs of Arroyo. (See Brief of 
Appellant.) The state disagrees and argues consent was valid. The state's arguments 
should be rejected for the reasons set forth herein. 
A. IN DEFENSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS RULING 
CONCERNING CONSENT. THE STATE SEEMS TO ARGUE THAT THIS 
COURT SHOULD OVERRULE OR REWORK PORTIONS OF HAM. THAT IS 
UNNECESSARY SINCE THE STATE'S COMPLAINTS CONCERNING HAM 
ARE INCONSEQUENTIAL AND DO NOT CURE THE FACTUAL 
INADEQUACIES IN THE RECORD. 
Hansen maintains that the state failed to present evidence sufficient to support 
consent. Specifically, during the evidentiary hearing in this matter, Officer Huntington 
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testified that he obtained consent from Hansen to search the car as follows: Officer 
Huntington asked Hansen if he had "alcohol, weapons, or drugs" in the vehicle. When 
Hansen answered "no" to that question, Officer Huntington asked, "Well, do you mind if 
I check?" (R. 84:17-18, 38-40, 43.) Officer Huntington testified twice that Hansen 
answered "yes" to the second question. (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.) 
Because Officer Huntington's testimony failed to support consent, Judge Lewis 
alerted the officer to the problem. (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.) Thereafter, Officer Huntington 
reconsidered the matter and testified only in a conclusory fashion. He stated that Hansen 
indicated "Yes, I could have consent," he "did give me consent," "he gave me consent," 
and "I assume that he said yes" for consent. (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.) Officer Huntington 
failed to provide a factual basis to support his conclusory statements.1 
Hansen maintains there is no factual basis for the conclusive testimony. In 
support of his argument, he has challenged relevant findings made by the trial court, and 
he has relied on this Court's analysis in State v. Ham. 910 P.2d at 439. (See Brief of 
Appellant at 12-15.) 
In response to Hansen's arguments on appeal, the state takes issue with Ham. 
1 On closer examination, Officer Huntington testified that he could not recall what he said 
or what Hansen said regarding consent; he assumed Hansen said yes; and "[h]e probably 
could have said yes, go ahead," but he did not recall. (R. 84:17-18, 38-40, 43.) Hansen 
argued in the opening Brief that this case is similar to Ham. "Undoubtedly, this is not 
'clear and positive' testimony which is necessary to meet the State's burden that a 
defendant unequivocally and specifically consented to a search." Ham, 910 P.2d at 440. 
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According to the state, the consent analysis in Ham is not based on persuasive authority 
and in part must be abandoned. 
Hansen maintains that argument is irrelevant to the issue on appeal and should be 
disregarded. See infra point A. 1., herein. 
In addition, the state is unable to identify specific, clear facts of record to support 
the trial court's ruling concerning consent. See infra point A.2., herein. For the reasons 
set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, and as more fully set forth below, Hansen 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
1. The State's Arguments Concerning Ham Are Irrelevant. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, this Court has established an 
analytical framework for considering the issue of consent. The Court reiterated the 
framework in 1996, when it issued State v. Ham. 910 P.2d at 439. Ham requires the state 
to adhere to the following standards in proving that consent was voluntarily given: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal 
and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when 
evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.M 
IcL at 439 (citing State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)))); see also United 
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States v. Medlin. 842 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988). 
According to the state, Ham was incorrectly decided; its reliance on Abbott was 
misplaced for two reasons: First, the state claims the "presumption-against-the-waiver" 
standard identified in Abbott is no longer good law. The state urges this Court to 
"abandon that [presumption]" in Ham. (State's Brief of Appellee ("S.B.") at 10.) Second, 
the state claims the first two standards identified in Abbott and reiterated in Ham are 
combined to formulate the "voluntariness" test. According to the state, that is relevant 
because under federal law, the "voluntariness" test is reviewed under the deferential 
"clearly erroneous" standard, while "voluntariness" under Utah law is reviewed for 
correctness. The state urges this Court to rework the analysis in Ham and to adopt the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for consent issues. (S.B. at 15-18.) 
As set forth below, the state's criticisms concerning Ham are not relevant to a 
resolution of the issue on appeal in this case. This Court does not need to decide the 
issues presented in the state's Brief of Appellee. 
(a) The issue on appeal in this case does not concern the "presumption-
against-the-waiver" standard set forth in Ham, Thus, this Court does not 
need to abandon that presumption in order to resolve the issue on appeal. 
The state asserts that the "presumption-against-the-waiver" standard articulated in 
Ham is inappropriate. According to the state, the United States Supreme Court abandoned 
that presumption in 1973, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
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followed suit in 1991. (S.B. at 9-10 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 
(1973); United States v. Price, 925 P.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1991).) 
The state's argument concerning the "presumption-against-the-waiver" standard is 
irrelevant to the issue on appeal in this case. Hansen is not urging this Court to reverse the 
trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress because of an improper application of that 
standard; Hansen has not claimed on appeal that the trial judge misapplied the 
"presumption-against-the-waiver" standard. (See Brief of Appellant in general.) 
Stated another way, assuming arguendo the state is correct and the "presumption-
against-the-waiver" standard is not applicable to consent under the Fourth Amendment, 
the state's argument is irrelevant. There is nothing in this case to indicate one way or the 
other that such a presumption played a part in Judge Lewis' ruling on Hansen's motion to 
suppress. To the extent it did, Judge Lewis apparently was not influenced by such a 
presumption when she denied Hansen's motion. Thus, the state's complaint concerning 
the presumption is inconsequential to the issue on appeal in this case. 
Also, to the extent the state is asking this Court to overrule Ham and the 
framework it has established for determining whether consent was voluntary, this Court 
may not do so. In State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, f 7, 996 P.2d 1065, 1067, this Court 
ruled that it is "bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and cannot overrule another panel's 
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ruling." Id. Thus, I Iain. Is controlling and should not be nvemilnl by (his < 'onri 
(b) According to the state, the first t ivo standards articulated in Ham for 
determining voluntary consent must be reviewed only under the deferential 
"clearly-erroneous" standard. The state's argument is irrelevant and in part 
in conflict with Utah law. 
"Next the .tale assert* lh.il llu ' I niillli i in ml content in Abbott was not 
confined to the \ oluntariness of the consent, but included llu/ «iiif1kinio, • v I' the n idemr 
establishing that consent was given at al! ('J.II, at 10.) 1'he state argues that pursuant to 
ioucral case KM-. . ie prosecution must meet the following standards to establish valid 
^ support consent. In 
that respect, the evidence must be convincing "clear and positi>• "'  llml i niseiii 
"unequivocal and specific." (S.B. at 12-13.J Second, the prosecution mustprt^«v 
evidence to support, voluntary consent, in that consent was given without duress or 
The state's arguments appear to be consistent with llu: .malvsis in Hani. Hum, u 10 
-•'he !,presumption-against-the-waiverfl standard identified in Ham is consistent with 
state and federal law. That is, the United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court 
have reiterated time and again that searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions.11 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); Thompson v. Louisiana, 
469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990). Thus, unless 
the state has established the application of a well -delineated exception, there is a 
m t: sumption against the validity of the searc K <tate has failed to establish 
application of a well-delineated exception, this Court will not presume that defendant 
waived his right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure, but will find that the 
officer's conduct was unconstitutional 
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P.2d at 439 (there must be clear, positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; and the government must prove 
consent was without "duress or coercion, express or implied"). 
Yet, according to the state, there is a difference in the analysis. The difference is 
the way in which the issues are reviewed on appeal. (S.B. at 15.) According to the state, 
the federal courts review "the trial court's determination that a consent to search was 
voluntary or involuntary under a clearly erroneous standard" (S.B. at 15), while Utah 
courts consider the matter under the correctness standard. According to the state, unless 
this Court applies only the clearly erroneous standard to a review of the trial court's 
determinations in this case, it will lead to an absurd result. (See S.B. at 15.) 
The state's argument is unpersuasive two reasons. First, the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review already plays a prominent role in review of the issue on appeal in this 
case. Specifically, Hansen is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relating to 
voluntary consent. As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, "the findings 
supporting 'voluntary' consent are clearly erroneous." (Brief of Appellant at 13-14.) To 
that end, in accordance with Utah (and federal) case law on the matter, Hansen has 
identified the findings of fact that he maintains are "clearly erroneous," he has marshaled 
the evidence in favor of the findings, and he has demonstrated why the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. (See Brief of Appellant at 11-17.) Thus, since the 
"clearly erroneous" standard is already applicable in this case under Utah law, there is no 
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adopt the federal standard of review. See infra point A.l .(b)(i), herein. 
Second, even if federal courts applied a different standard of review, this Court 
cannot overrule aw Oiiuiaitcu ^ o?c to consent issues as articulated by the 
1 Huh Nnpivme ('onrl 111 Stale v. Fcna, > d lH] \ I i(jili I****-11 iiiuj Stale v. Ihurman, 
846 pB2d 1256 (Utah 1993) Pena and Thurman are contr oiling in '. . • 
f.irther set forth below. See intra point \
 v j(ii)? herein. 
.
 t, 17?<? state's argument is irrelevant since the "clearly-erroneous" standard 
.'V.«Y/V n'.r,'- a prominent role in this case. 
According to the state the I hufnl Nliiti s ( "oninl 1 Il / ppi.vils I'm Ilii1* Irnth < "inn iiii 
"reviews the trial court's determination that a consent to search was voluntary or 
involuntary under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v, Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 
< ' . . ) 1 (1 Oth Ch 1998) I Jtah appellate courts, on the other hand, 1 e\ iew 
ness standard." (S.B. at 15 (citing 1 hui man. 846 P.2d at 12 71).) Ihe state apparently is 
making the argument concerning the different standards of review in an effort to 
: „ uurcatec siunaau oi ic\ic\\ in favor of the 
"clearly erroneous" standard use: d in the I enth Cii a lit C01 11 1: c I \ ppeals. 
The state's argument is irrelevant and should be disregarded. The "clear!) 
erroneous" standi * -* 1 c\ iew is applicable in relevant part, to the issue on appeal in this 
r.r.c I hinder 1 It; i p M fad and lllllic: 1 iiiderl) leg factual Issues are reviewed for 
clear error State v. Davis. 821 P.2d *) 1 1  il I  II I  '" q\\ I  'Ml I | I i i i l i t c t i m l i s s u e s u m s i s l 
9 
of "the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or 
taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. 
Findings must be grounded in the facts of record. See Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 
474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). They must be detailed and articulated in such a way so that 
the basis for the ultimate conclusion can be understood. See Williamson v. Williamson, 
1999 UT App 219, ][9, 983 P.2d 1103. A trial court's findings are clearly erroneous if 
they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young v. 
Young, 1999 UT 38,1fl5, 979 P.2d 338. Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they 
are "not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
Hansen has challenged the factual basis for the trial court's findings and ultimate 
ruling in this matter. He maintains that the findings are not adequately supported by the 
record. Thus, they are "clearly erroneous." (See Brief of Appellant at 13-17.) Since the 
findings are not adequately supported by the record, the ultimate conclusion cannot be 
upheld as a matter of law. 
This Court may disregard the state's argument to adopt the federal standard of 
review since the clearly-erroneous standard already plays a prominent role in this case. 
(ii) This court is required to apply the law as articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court; it is not bound by the standards of review articulated by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
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In support of its argument th.il iiu . I 'pint lioiiitl ndnp! » IM M** tit •« "'Nl1,'1 ' unlaid 
,;f re\ icw in considering consent issues under the Fourth Amendment, the state cites to 
ciu tierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d at 1231 (S.B. at 15-18.) The state seems to argue that 
determination as to whether consent w:i 
The state apparently has duskd oil and resurrected an argument that the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected in Thuiman. 846 P.2d at 1265-66. There, the court stated the 
The State argue|U| mat; jir-u:r- i _ ^.nc . ,*;;, v,»;t s -deter* oi-
\otuiitariness ofconsent LOL i Knn\u *:• clement purposes, Sclv^ . .**tn aiu; 
Mendenhait require this court to app!> ihe same standard of review used by 
federal appellate courts. However, the State does nol cite M> any authority tor this 
position arc does not explain its reasoning. It simph assumes that the appropriate 
standard ol review is a question of federal law \ )r* own research has re\e;ucd 
little case law or secondary authority on this point. l b after reflecting on 
the principles governing the choice of a particular standard of review and 
considering the law on analogous questions, we have concluded that this court is 
not required to apply federal standards of review when presented with challenges 
to trial court determinations made under federal law 
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1265 4 fter clarifying that Utah appellate courts are not bound by 
Inlcnil il.iniLiids oil iv\ u \\ Ilk i oml in I liniiiiiaii lixed the stundaid ol review "to be 
usedb> Utah appellate courts in reviewing trial nmirf determinations of \'i ^ liiiil.'ii mrss ill 
consent for purposes of deciding whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendiiichi icL at 126! • * ..n -unrcmc Court r-v.-1 iiat the trial court's 
* * ndcrlying laciual I Hidings 
l i 
would not be set aside unless they were found to be clearly erroneous. Id_at 1271. 
The state has failed to recognize the law set forth in Thurman. That case is 
controlling. In light of Thurman, the state's argument must fail. 
2. The State Claims the Evidence Supports Consent: Yet, the State's Analysis 
Fails to Recognize the Difference Between Detailed Facts Supporting the 
Determination, and Conclusions of Law. 
With respect to the trial court's findings and conclusions, Hansen maintains that 
the findings set forth at paragraphs 27-29 are clearly erroneous. (R. 66; Brief of 
Appellant at 13-17.) The state disagrees and claims that Officer Huntington's testimony 
- that he asked for consent — supports the detailed finding. According to the state, 
Officer Huntington "asked [Hansen] for consent to search the vehicle," "asked 
[defendant] for consent," "confirmed at least two more times that he asked for consent," 
and testified that "[he] did give me consent," "Yes, I could have consent to search," and 
"Yes, he did give me consent." (S.B. at 18-22.) Conspicuously absent from the state's 
recitation of "facts" is any detail reflecting positive, clear, unequivocal events, 
circumstances, conditions, or actions to support the legal determination that Officer 
Huntington obtained consent to search. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935 (findings of fact 
consist of details of "events, actions, or conditions"). The state's argument also lacks 
legal analysis and support. (See S.B. at 18-24.) 
According to Utah case law, "consent" is a legal conclusion. See Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1271-72. Officer Huntington's testimony on the ultimate issue — without 
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necessary detail -- erodes confidence in the evidentiary IUM- ' * k4>* * s ] * > ; 
allowed to provide legal conclusions as a basis for his conduct, his erroneous standai J~ 
may never be discovered. That is, if Officer I Iiiiitington has a definition for consent that 
mi1, lion u insistent v\ 1111 ill I;i\\, Ins iLiilun, iim pi milt liiM.iil1,, m Mippmi Ins .u'lions will 
protect his conduct from judicial scrutiny. So long as he is \\\U)\\ cd In testify thiif i/onsrnt 
was provided, as he did in this case, he essentially may dictate the ruling in the matter to 
the trial judge. 
In addition the leslimnii on (In iilliiiuik" issue , , - : , he 
evidentiary hearing. The hearing is a process for seekim ; liscovering the 
total circumstances supporting the officer's conduct, Ilie conclusive testimony prevents 
discovery •= i Uu. circumstances, and it prevents defense counsel from engaging in 
,fi
-
M
 - . . . . , , ..... . .ourts from 
effective!} considering the officei &CK" * * - . '..•* -\ ' y v\ ere 
constitutional under the circumstances, Stak, her way, the conclusory statements 
prohibit exploration of the issue on the basis of the facts. If the testimony in this case 
mini! Ilr ioiinnl 1 In Mi l ln in i l in Irliiill wilh ii 'spi'd (oeui i ls .iinil conditions, it would 
undermine the need for evident]an hearings and factual finding ? j | 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ann- l*>9h (findings reveal trial court's 
reasoning process and must be .^macuih .id •• *atc ex rel. ST. , 928 P.2d 393, 398 
lULlll IWCfll 
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As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, the detailed facts reflect that when 
Officer Huntington described the circumstances surrounding the event, Hansen did not 
consent. Officer Huntington testified twice that he sought consent by asking Hansen if 
he had any drugs, alcohol or weapons in the car. When Hansen answered no, Officer 
Huntington asked, "do you mind if I check." Hansen answered "yes."' Hansen's clear, 
unequivocal response did not constitute consent to search. (See R. 84:17-18, 38-40.)3 
In the evidentiary hearing, Officer Huntington refused to provide any further 
detail regarding the matter. Rather, his testimony was conclusory and vague. (See S.B. 
at 23 (officer did not recall how he asked for consent, he did not recall defendant's exact 
words, he assumed defendant said yes in his "wording", defendant "probably could have 
said yes, go ahead"); R. 84:17-18, 38-40, 43.) 
It stands to reason that if the record must contain sufficient evidence to support 
the detailed findings, the record must contain the details. Since Officer Huntington failed 
3 As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, each time Officer Huntington testified 
with respect to the details of the encounter, Judge Lewis interrupted the examination and 
pointed out problems with the officer's testimony and the state's case. Curiously, in its 
brief, the state at one point has identified Judge Lewis as the "prosecutor.ff (See S.B. at 
21, where the state identified the examiner as the "prosecutor,ff while the record at 84:18 
reflected that "The Court" interrupted and conducted the examination.) Certainly Judge 
Lewis seemed to assist the prosecutor when the detailed evidence did not support 
consent. 
In that regard, while the state asserts that the "clearly erroneous" standard 
recognizes that the trial judge generally is in the best position to assess the evidence (S.B. 
at 18), in this case, the record reflects that the trial judge was in the best position to ensure 
the evidence would support the state's position. That is not a trial court function and 
should not be condoned. 
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to provide sufficient detail to .> wort the detetnunatu m tli.il I iunsai prov ided ronsenl (lie 
trial court.'s ruling on the matter must be reversed. The record fails to contain substantial 
or competent testimony to support, the findings. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687 ("[a] finding not 
supported '»y siihsLuili.il competent evidence must be rejected'11). 
B. AClUKUiiNU i u l i i b S i A i K A l IHKPOIN'I WHERE OFFICER 
HUNTINGTON RETURNED THE LICENSE AND REGISTRATION TO 
HANSEN, THE LEVEL-TWO ENCOUNTER ENDED AND THE MATTER 
BECAME CONSENSUAL. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT SEEMS TO DRAW 
BRIGHT LINES TO SUIT THE STATE'S PURPOSE. WHILE THE TOTAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORT A CONTINUED, UNLAWFUL. LEVEL-TWO 
DETENTION. 
As sel i<M'il» I'" iht opening Line I ol Appellant, the consent also \va* iina.n ^.-e^e 
it was nhumcd h\ polier ifc\ploihMm|i < I i pin i jllewi'ili See tiam 
Specifically, the alleged consent came on the heels of an unlawful, level-two detention in 
v iolalKn! oFTerry v.Ohio. 392 I J.S. 1, 1.0 (1.968); see also State v... Deitman. 739 P.2d 
616, 617-18(1 -utr 198^. An unlawful, level-two detention occurs when an officer Lias 
detained, the occupants of a vehicle beyond, the permissible scope. 
In response I'1 IlimsenV iiipimenl • rut ntiiiif." (In, inil.tw 11jI detention, ! 111 k.!,ile 
asserts that the matter transformed into a level-one consensual encounter at the point 
where the officer warned Hansen about the insurance violation and returned Hansen's 
license and tar registration to linn, "In shoil, "i Hheer Huntington's verbal warning that 
dHendmit needed to obtain insnririf f ;mrl liir n (iiiiii nl delrndanl i r^^islr.itinn .inil 
driver's license signaled the end of the detention such that a reasonable person would 
feel free to leave." (S.B. at 30, 31.) 
The state's argument purports to draw bright lines in the encounter to suit its 
purpose. In addition, the state's argument fails to take into consideration the totality of 
the circumstances. See State v. Higgins. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (person is 
seized under the fourth amendment when, considering the totality of the circumstances, 
the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not free 
to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his 
business). 
The total circumstances relating to the matter reflect the following: According to 
the facts, Officer Huntington engaged in a traffic stop for two reasons: improper lane 
change, and failure to maintain insurance. (S.B. at 27.) After Officer Huntington 
stopped Hansen's vehicle, he approached Hansen's car and "informed the defendant why 
he had been stopped." (R. 84:12; 65, FF at f 17; S.B. at 28.) Officer Huntington also 
"requested [Hansen's] driver's license, registration, and insurance information." (R. 65, 
FFat1fl7;S.B.at28.) 
Officer Huntington returned to his car to conduct a warrants and computer check, 
then walked back to Hansen's car. At that point in the encounter, a second uniformed 
officer arrived at the scene with emergency lights engaged. He got out of his patrol car 
and stood behind Hansen's car. (R. 84:14-15, 36.) Thereafter, Officer Huntington 
returned the license and registration to Hansen and he informed Hansen that he had to 
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obtain insurance and maintain proof of insurance in his car (R 8 1 :16 1 7, 38 I ( HTiva' 
Huntington also asked Hansen whether he had drugs, alcohol or weapons in the car and 
he asked to conduct a searcu m <^*1'7 i8? 38-4(U ^ c e r Huntington kept the 
rmerjjcna a|iiipiiiuiiil unii iimr. n,.mi engageu during ihi J matter. 
At the point where Officer Huntington warned I lansni about tin: iihm iiin i 
Vlaunn and returned the license and registration to Hansen, the total circumstances that 
made tne encounte- a level-two detention were still present and arguabh escalating ~^ut 
••>n s peispeUiu1, < Hliui Ihiiilini'lon sdiilll . „*.. ;ndiuia.w -iow 
lie intended to resolve the violation for Hie improper lane eliani?,*' .uiil his emergent \ 
lights were still engaged, A reasonable person would expect that before he may be tree 
f
^ teave. the officer womo indicate how he intended to resolve tlu reason for the stop, 
-.ondouisiiK .. < u A a^u.ng questions., 
wnik a second officer lictu arnvcu " • • • • i ?. 
84:14-15.) 
The state argues that the Fourth Amendment does not "require particular 
language, or words at all, to signal the end of a detention." (S.B. at 30.) As set forth in 
tin1 miiniiit!.1 Uriel nil Appelliinl, lliinsen din11, mil i I.iiiii ill ill nri II Hurl nul \|i(it IlLiiill ,i!ll " " 
n. 4.) Rather, Hansen asserts that since a reasonable person cannot be expected lo inul ilic 
officer's mind, it is appropriate to consider the total circumstances to determine if the 
officer has somehow indicated to the person that he is free to leave, See State v. 
i / 
Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996) (where officer has somehow 
communicated through words or import of situation that person is free to go, Court will 
find level-one encounter); State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 769 (Ohio 1997) (on 
remand from the United States Supreme Court). 
For example, an officer's conduct may be construed to communicate that a person 
is free to leave where the officer has (i) indicated to the person how he intends to resolve 
the violation that justified the stop in the first place; (ii) advised the person as to how he 
should proceed in light of the reason for the stop (i.e., when negotiating a left-hand turn, 
pull into the inside lane); (iii) walked away from the car; (iv) discontinued questioning; 
(v) disengaged the emergency equipment on his car; or (vi) wished the person a good day. 
Officer Huntington did none of these things. 
In this case, the total circumstances reflected that Officer Hunlington "handed 
[Hansen] his driver's license and registration and I asked him for consent to search the 
vehicle." (R. 84:16.) Thus, without any apparent break in the conversation, while Officer 
Huntington remained standing at Hansen's window and a second officer stood behind 
Hansen's car, Huntington continued to question Hansen. The conduct did not give 
Hansen any indication that he was free to go, but communicated the opposite - that 
Hansen was not free to leave until he answered the additional questions. 
In addition, inasmuch as Officer Huntington had communicated to Hansen that he 
intended only to give him a warning for the insurance violation and Huntington had not 
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yet communicated his intent with respect to the improper lane change, Hansen may have 
believed he would be ticketed if he did not cooperate. Those facts are relevant to the total 
circumstances in considering that Hansen simply submitted to a claim of authority and 
implied coercion. Given Officer Huntington's superior position of authority, and the total 
circumstances of this case, any reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to 
the additional questioning. 
Finally, the state seeks to minimize the improper intrusion by claiming the 
questions could not have taken "more than a few seconds." (S.B. at 31; see also S.B. at 
32 (the "two brief questions did not extend the detention").) That argument is irrelevant.4 
Under the law, a "temporary" or brief detention is improper unless it is supported by 
reasonable articulable suspicion. This Court has stated the following: 
[Once] the occupants of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the initial stop, 
the officer must permit them to proceed." [State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 
(Utah App. 1992)] "'Any further temporary detention for investigative 
questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified 
under the fourth amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting [State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 435 (Utah App. 1990)].) 
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 659 (bold emphasis added). Also, "[unsupported] by further 
4 That argument is also incorrect. As the facts reflect, the unrelated interrogation lead 
from one event to the next, where Hansen answered the questions, stepped out of the car, 
submitted to a frisk search, submitted to a search of the car, answered more questions, 
was arrested, and was subjected to a search incident to arrest. (R. 84:19-23,41-42.) The 
unrelated investigation was intrusive and extensive. 
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probable cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions 
unrelated to the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope 
of the circumstances that rendered it permissible." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1135 
(Utah 1994). M[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983). If a detention lasts any longer than is justified, it is unlawful. At the point where 
the officer's reasonable suspicions are allayed, there is no further reason for the stop, and 
the officer must allow the detainee to leave. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 
1996). 
The continued detention was unlawful where it exceeded the scope of the 
justification for the stop. See Commonwealth v. Ferrara. 381 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Mass. 
1978) (once suspect had identified himself satisfactorily, "there was no basis for further 
interrogation"); Madison v. State. 357 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ind. App. 1976) (police 
unjustifiably continued investigation of person sleeping in parked car at 9:00 a.m. after he 
adequately answered the initial inquiries concerning his well-being). 
The state does not claim that Officer Huntington had reasonable articulable 
suspicion to support continued, investigative questioning. (See S.B. in general.) Further, 
the state does not dispute that the questions concerning alcohol, weapons, drugs and a 
search of the car were unrelated to the justification for the stop in the first place and 
exceeded the permissible scope. Thus, the continued detention was unlawful. Lopez, 873 
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P.2d at 1133 (continued investigative questioning that further detains the driver must be 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity). 
The unlawful detention preceded the consent, thereby rendering the consent 
unconstitutional. Ham, 910 P.2d at 440-41. The evidence discovered in connection with 
the unlawful consent must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state failed in the trial court to establish a valid consent to support a search of 
the vehicle. In addition, the consent was poisoned by the prior police illegality. Hansen 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to 
suppress. 
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